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Introduction 
 
What happened to the radicalism of the CIO? It was the great hope of my parents’ 
generation. But in the 1960s, we in the Movement waited in vain for the labor movement to take 
a stand against the Vietnam war. And when corporate America began to move manufacturing to 
low wage locations in the 1970s, there was a “management prerogatives” clause in the contracts 
of all the new industrial unions that forced them to stand on the sidelines as their members’ work 
left town. 
I recall a gathering at the apartment of Paul Booth, one of the first presidents of the 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and, later on, organizing director of AFSCME 
(American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees). The question of the day was 
that posed above: What happened to the radicalism of the CIO? The answers offered included: 
(1) in contrast to the explicit intent of the draft persons of the Wagner Act,1 the Supreme Court 
ruled that workers who went on strike could be “replaced,” that is, fired; (2) during World War 
II, the labor movement abandoned the strike, turned to grievance arbitration, and never found its 
way back to direct action; (3) after World War II, the Taft-Hartley Act and McCarthyism drove 
Left wingers out of the unions; (4) throughout the years 1935-1945, CIO staff associated with the 
Communist Party downplayed conflict with the Democratic Party in the interest of building an 
anti-fascist political coalition.  
The purpose of this essay is to propose another answer: The CIO became what its creator, 
United Mine Workers (UMW) president John L. Lewis, intended it to be. It was a group of 
unions each of which, like the UMW, required all the workers on a given work site to become 
members, and these unions served as the exclusive representative of those workers in collective 
bargaining. When CIO unions were recognized by employers as exclusive bargaining 
representatives, dues were deducted from workers’ paychecks by the employer and forwarded to 
the union. Typical CIO contracts contained two key provisions: a “management prerogative 
clause” that allowed the employer to close and move production facilities at its discretion, and a 
“no-strike clause” that prevented the workers from doing anything effective about such 
decisions. Finally, while radical organizers and militant tactics were used to obtain the position 
of exclusive representative, once the new unions were recognized by management, those 
organizers were fired. 
Author after author, labor historians on the Left have compiled a devastating critique of 
John L. Lewis’ style of trade unionism. We agree that Lewis’ management style, first in the 
United Mine Workers (UMW) and then in financing and supervising the formation of the CIO, 
was not merely “business unionism”; it was dictatorial, autocratic and explicitly anti-Communist 
or anti-socialist business unionism. Indeed, Lewis advertised the CIO to business leaders as a 
remedy for wildcat strikes and other industrial direct action.2 The new CIO unions deliberately 
broke up militant local industrial unions like Local 65 of the Steelworkers in South Chicago and 
Local 156 of the UAW in Flint (Lynd, 1996: 12-14). Even mainstream labor historian David 
Brody writes that Lewis “made no bones about his contempt for democratic processes .... With 
John L. Lewis as the heroic figure of the 1930s, it is no wonder that those great days did not 
transform American trade unionism into a social movement” (Brody, 1980: 169-170). 
 
  
Lewis:  Con and Pro 
 
Yet when we come to the last pages of their books or the final paragraphs of their articles, 
radical historians often give Lewis and the CIO unions that he sponsored and financed a free 
pass.  
 Lewis’ sharpest critic may be Jim Pope (2003). Pope writes that “according to the 
standard story” of labor history in the 1930s, Lewis, anticipating the enactment of section 7(a) of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, committed the entire treasury of the United Mine Workers 
in May 1933 to a massive organizing campaign in the soft coal fields. Thanks to Lewis’ far-
sighted leadership, we have been told, in little more than a year UMW membership quintupled, 
from about a hundred thousand to about half a million. 
The reality, according to Pope, was altogether different. Miners in southwestern 
Pennsylvania began to organize more than two and a half months before the passage of the 
NIRA. Paid UMW staff initially opposed the rank-and-file initiatives or dragged their feet. Pope 
says that Lewis was 
 
a step behind the local union activists. His celebrated organizing campaign was 
not launched until after rank-and-file miners had already rejuvenated the union. 
Once deployed, his organizers worked persistently to undermine the strike 
movement that eventually delivered the code. . . . Thus, the sensational recovery 
of the UMW—later touted by Lewis as a product of centralized discipline and 
federal government lawmaking—was in fact brought about by a democratic 
movement of local activists enforcing their own vision of the right to organize 
(Pope, 2003). 
 
This article was published in 2003, almost fifteen years ago. Nonetheless the late James 
Green, in his otherwise magnificent book on West Virginia miners, The Devil Is Here in These 
Hills, manages to turn a bone-chilling narrative of Lewis’ repression of rank-and-file miners like 
Frank Keeney into a paean of praise to none other than John L. Lewis (Green, 2015). Ignoring 
Pope’s work, Green first tells us that the NIRA was the result of a “relentless lobbying effort” by 
Lewis, William Green, and their allies to win “federal assistance for organized labor.” 
Then, again ignoring Pope’s findings, Green tells us that the challenge to the UMW was 
to “exploit the NIRA’s promise,” and that it did so by “putting their toughest activists on the 
payroll and mobilizing them for an all-out organizing drive in the nation’s coalfields.” 
Two pages later we are told that “miners caught up in the union drive devoted songs, 
prayers, and poems to their savior, John L. Lewis.” Two more pages go by and Pope’s story of 
union locals being re-energized or created from below, against the opposition of the UMW’s 
staff, has been transformed into Green’s description of a public demonstration in which UMW 
bureaucrat Van Bittner administered the union oath of allegiance to five thousand men over a 
loudspeaker (Green, 2015: 326-332). 
 
Was the Little Steel Strike a Catastrophe? 
 
I want to emphasize again that the cacophony of praise for Lewis comes not only from 
the Right but also from the Left. Take the history of the steelworkers. 
  
The most radical analysis of the labor history of the 1930s is probably that set forth in the 
essay “Punching Out.” Published initially during 1952, it was labeled as the product of an 
individual, the late Marty Glaberman (2002). Actually, it seems, while written out by Glaberman, 
the booklet was the product of the collective learning experience of the entire so-called Johnson 
Forest group, affiliated with C.L.R. James. 
“Punching Out” refers to the “catastrophic strike in Little Steel” (Glaberman, 2002: 13). 
Little Steel was made up of the major steel companies other than the largest steel company, U.S. 
Steel, and the Little Steel strike was the walkout in 1937 that included the “Memorial Day 
Massacre” in South Chicago. 
But was the Little Steel strike a catastrophe? 
I have been puzzled for many years by the conflicting assessments of the Little Steel 
strike by John Sargent, head of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee at Inland Steel and then 
several times president of the United Steelworkers of America local union there, and by just 
about everybody else, including radicals like Glaberman. 
For instance, Ahmed White (2016), in his recently-published book The Last Great Strike: 
Little Steel, the CIO, and the Struggle for Labor Rights in New Deal America, voices the general 
opinion when he writes “the strike was broken” (White, 2016: 225). But Sargent, when I knew 
him about 1970 and when he spoke at a forum that I helped to organize, considered the outcome 
of the strike at Inland Steel a “victory of great proportions” (Sargent, 2011: 107). How could 
both statements be true? 
The answer was suggested by White’s book. I had assumed that because the strike was 
settled at Inland by an agreement, in Sargent’s words, “through the [Indiana] governor’s office,” 
it presumably applied to all Little Steel facilities in the state of Indiana, or at least to the 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube complex adjacent to the Inland steel facility in East Chicago, Indiana.  
However, White (2016: 223-224) convinces me that the Inland Steel settlement was 
unique. “Sheet & Tube,” he explains, “had been a party to the talks that led to the Inland 
agreement but withdrew just as the accord was reached.”  
The fact that the Inland settlement was one of a kind does not detract from its importance. 
Here are Sargent’s own words at the community forum mentioned above.  
The settlement provided that the company would recognize and bargain with “the 
Steelworkers Union and the company union and any other organization that wanted to represent 
the people in the steel industry” (Sargent, 2011: 107). And if it is assumed that only the 
exclusive right to bargain for the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit constituted victory, 
and steelworkers at the huge Inland Steel complex did not achieve such exclusive status, they 
must have been defeated. 
But defeat was not what was experienced by rank-and-file workers on the ground. White 
confirms that at Inland the company “reopened the Indiana Harbor mill amid cries of victory 
from thousands of jubilant workers” (White, 2016: 223). And during the next five years, 1937 to 
roughly 1942, since they had not entered into a typical CIO contract that required them to give 
up the right to strike during the duration of the bargaining agreement, Inland Steel workers could 
and they did back up their demands with successful direct action.  
In Sargent’s words: “The enthusiasm of the people who were working in the mills made 
this settlement of the strike into a victory of great proportions.” As he explained it: 
 
Without a contract, without any agreement with the company, without any 
regulation concerning hours of work, conditions of work, or wages, a tremendous 
  
surge took place. We talk of a rank-and-file movement: the beginning of union 
organization was the best kind of rank-and-file movement you could think of…. 
The union organizers were essentially workers in the mill who were so disgusted 
with their conditions and so ready for a change that they took the union into their 
own hands. 
  Without a contract we secured for ourselves agreements on working 
conditions and wages that we do not have today, and that were better by far than 
what we have today in the mill. For example, as a result of the enthusiasm of the 
people in the mill you had a series of strikes, wildcats, shut-downs, slow-downs, 
anything working people could think of to secure for themselves what they 
decided they had to have. If their wages were low there was no contract to 
prohibit them from striking, and they struck for better wages. If their conditions 
were bad, if they didn’t like what was going on, if they were being abused, the 
people in the mills themselves—without a contract or any agreement with the 
company involved—would shut down a department or even a group of 
departments to secure for themselves the things they found necessary (Lynd and 
Lynd, 2011: 223). 
 
My wife and I also interviewed Nick Migas, grievance committee man for the Inland 
Steel open hearth department where iron ore was made into steel (Lynd and Lynd, 2011: 168-
169). In those days, from 1937 until early in World War II, grievances tended to be negotiated 
with the supervisors immediately involved because the men could always simply stop work. 
They also tended to be settled more rapidly, for the same reason. Migas offered the example of a 
grievance for the charging car operators: 
 
They had increased the tonnage on the furnaces without increasing the rate. We 
discussed this question with the superintendent; nothing doing. So that night it 
started to slow down, and by the next morning there were two furnaces where 
they had to shut the heat off. By that evening, there were six furnaces that had to 
shut the heat off. They settled that grievance in a hurry (Lynd and Lynd, 2011: 
168-169). 
 
The testimony by a third Inland steelworker, Joe Gyurko, is cited by Kim Scipes (2003: 
156) to the same effect. Gyurko recalls that in the 1936-42 pre-contract period, 
 
departmental strikes were common. When foremen or supervisors refused to deal 
with pressing issues affecting work conditions, the men thought nothing of 
stopping work and letting gondolas full of molten steel hang in mid-air. In these 
situations, the rapidly approaching danger that production would be interrupted 
in order to clean out the gondola and reheat the steel acted as a time clock, 
forcing the company to bargain with the workers (Scipes, 2003: 156, citing 
Nyden, 1984: 24). 
 
Academic sources support the recollection of these rank-and-file workers. Robert R. R. 
Brooks quotes John Mayo, subregional director of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 
Youngstown: “In some respects the union was better off [in Little Steel] than in many U.S. Steel 
  
plants since it was not bound by a contract to confine its grievance claims to matters covered by 
the contract. It was able, therefore, to press and sometimes win grievance claims which under the 
standard steel contract would be thrown out in the early stages of adjustment” (Brooks, 1940: 
146).  
After citing Sargent and Migas in Rank and File, and examining the grievance committee 
minutes at Inland Steel during the late 1930s, Lizabeth Cohen states that “at steel mills where the 
SWOC did not yet have contracts and hence did not control the rank and file, shop floor agitation 
persisted” (Cohen, 1990: 306-307).  
 
Is Members-only Bargaining a Transitional Stage or a Permanent Arrangement? 
 
In 2005, Charles J. Morris published The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic 
Rights in the American Workplace.3 In effect, the book suggested that what workers at Inland 
Steel experienced after settlement of the Little Steel strike was what is today referred to as 
“minority” or “members-only” unionism, legally protected, according to Morris, by Section 7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act. 
The critical difference between what Morris describes and what Sargent and his co-
workers experienced is that Morris understands members-only unionism as a transitional stage 
toward exclusive representation by a single union. Morris’ perception is evident throughout his 
book. The following characterizations are drawn from the opening pages. I have emphasized the 
words that distinguish his outlook from Sargent’s. 
 
[T]he National Labor Relations Act indelibly guarantees the right of 
minority-union employees to engage in members-only collective bargaining where 
a majority of the employees have not yet designated an exclusive union 
representative.” (Morris, 2005: xvi). 
Although the ultimate goal of the Wagner Act was the institution of 
exclusive collective bargaining with majority unions, in workplaces where 
majority bargaining was not yet established, Congress did not intend to bar 
minority-union members-only bargaining” (Morris, 2005: 4-5). 
The legislative history of the 1935 Wagner Act shows positively that its 
authors fully and intentionally protected . . . all minority-union bargaining that 
would occur prior to mature majority-based exclusive bargaining” (Morris, 
2005: 10). 
 
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the first quarter of the 20th century and 
individual radicals like John Sargent in the second quarter understood minority unionism quite 
differently. They believed that they were creating a new world within the shell of the old. They 
intended a unionism to exist permanently in which problems were settled as they arose and the 
right to strike was never given up.  
In my Introduction to a book of essays about the “alternative unions” of the early 1930s 
(Lynd, 1996: 4). I commented that while working on the book, I had been struck by “the 
resemblance between the ‘alternative unionism’ of the 1930s and the rank-and-file militancy of 
the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).  
 Individual Wobblies or former Wobblies were often involved in the local industrial 
unions of the 1930s (Lynd, 1996: 4-5). In some situations, the rank-and-file militancy of the 
  
IWW and the efforts of a more traditional union to establish itself in a particular workplace or 
company co-existed for many years.  
Thus in the anthracite coal fields of eastern Pennsylvania, IWW membership from 1906 
to 1916 was about equal to membership in the United Mine Workers. The late Michael Kozura 
pointed out that “anthracite miners continued to rely on illegal wildcat strikes and other forms of 
direct action, refused on principle to submit grievances to arbitration, tenaciously resisted the 
contractual regulation of their labor, opposed union dues check-off, habitually rebelled against 
the UMW’s dictatorial leadership, and sustained this militant syndicalism into the late 1940s” 
(Lynd, 1996: 4, citing Kozura, 1996). 
A Wobbly style of organizing was sometimes in evidence even when flesh-and- blood 
Wobblies were not. David Montgomery has suggested that “in many ways the struggles of 1916-
1922 . . . presaged those of at least the early 1930s, that is, before the founding of the Committee 
for Industrial Organization and the enactment of the Wagner Act” (Lynd, 1996: 5, citing 
Montgomery, 1987: 457).  
 The Westinghouse plant east of Pittsburgh is an example of such continuity. Montgomery 
describes how just before World War I the Westinghouse workers created an “inplant 
organization made up of their own elected delegates” that cut across traditional craft lines. The 
organization “copied the IWW by devoting itself to struggles around demands, rather than 
negotiating contracts” (Lynd, 1996: 5). More than twenty years later, when the CIO established 
itself in the same plant, bargaining was at first carried on in the same Wobbly manner. According 
to Ronald Schatz, 
 
an arrangement existed whereby plant managers would meet with the leaders of 
UE Local 601 to negotiate such issues as hours of work or layoff policy, then 
depart to post the results of their discussions as if management had merely 
consulted with the union leadership. Although there were few if any Wobblies . . . 
in the plant, the local had arrived at an IWW-style bargaining relationship. There 
were no contracts; all agreements could be abrogated by either party at any time; 
and grievances were settled quickly according to the strength of the workers on 
the floor of the plant (Lynd, 1996: 5, citing Schatz, 1983: 73). 
 
As at Westinghouse, the spirit of alternative unionism often carried over into the 
strongest local unions of the emerging CIO. Many CIO locals, not only in steel, anthracite 
mining, and electrical work, but also in the automobile assembly and rubber tire industries, 
initially opposed workplace contractualism in the form of written contracts and the dues 
checkoff. Sylvia Woods, who belonged to a UAW local in Chicago during World War II, 
recalled: “We never had a check-off. We didn’t want it” (Lynd, 1996: 5, citing Woods, 2011: 
118).4 In rubber, sit-downs at General Tire, Firestone, and elsewhere convinced tire makers that 
“progress did not have to await a formal contract.” Goodrich Local 5 in Akron, whose 13,000 
members made it the largest local union in the United Rubber Workers, for several years in the 
1930s deliberately declined to enter into a collective bargaining agreement (Lynd, 1996: 5, citing 
Borsos, 1992: 25-26). 
 
Although Goodrich was willing in April 1937 to come to an agreement, the first 
contract was not signed until May 27, 1938. [Local union leaders] felt that unless 
all demands were won, an agreement would so restrict freedom of action that it 
  
would not be worthwhile (Lynd, 1996: 21, endnote #24, citing Anthony, 1942: 
654). 
 
Thus a community-based, horizontally-bonded culture of struggle, with roots in such epic 
battles as the 1916 Westinghouse strike, the Lawrence, Massachusetts strikes of cotton textile 
workers in 1912 and 1919, community-based strikes in coal mining and cotton textile towns in 
the 1920s, and the Little Steel Strike at Inland Steel, pervaded the alternative unionism of the 
early 1930s and the first years of many CIO local unions.  
Accordingly we are left with a “road not taken” that would make possible not only a 
consistently bottom-up recasting of modern American labor history, but a joyful convergence 
with historians of Polish Solidarity, with narrators of what didn’t happen in France in 1968, and 
above all, with George Orwell and Noam Chomsky in offering homage to the anarcho-
syndicalist movement in Catalonia during the Spanish civil war (see Chomsky, 2005).5  
 
The Road Not Taken May Still Be There 
 
The work that may come closest to the kind of pervasively radical history for which I am 
calling is Frank Bardacke’s Trampling out the Vintage: Cesar Chavez and the Two Souls of the 
United Farm Workers. 
A number of recent articles and books call into question the myths that surrounded Cesar 
Chavez, beginning in the 1960s and for another twenty years following his death in 1993. 
Bardacke’s work stands out for its deep immersion in rank-and-file sources and, analytically, for 
its perception of the influence of Saul Alinsky. 
One of Alinsky’s books, a biography of John L. Lewis, was a breathless paean of praise 
to its subject. It happens that for about three years, I was one of the original faculty of Alinsky’s 
Industrial Areas Foundation Training Institute. I remember Alinsky commenting with wonder 
that for periods of time in the mid-1930s, there was more mention of Lewis by the media than of 
President Franklin Roosevelt. 
Alinsky is the link between Lewis and both the conventional misstatement of how the 
NLRA and CIO came into being and liberal adulation of Chavez as a supposed alternative to 
Lewis’ top-down organizing style. In a chapter entitled “The Alchemist,” Bardacke spells out 
Saul Alinsky’s influence on Cesar Chavez. 
Alinskyite community organizing, Bardacke writes, has become “a codified discipline, 
with core theoretical propositions, recognized heresies, disciples, neophytes, and splits. It is a 
political theory....” (Bardacke, 2011: 68). One of my two colleagues on the original Training 
Institute staff, Dick Harmon, has written about Alinsky organizing in the 1970s: 
 
Our operating assumptions were that you didn’t ask basic questions about the 
economy because that would label you a “pinko,” an ideologue, and worse. If you 
raised these kinds of questions, the climate of the time would shut you down, so 
you had to be pragmatic. . . . We had no ongoing, fundamental analysis of the 
economy, no long-term diagnosis. No one was asking about alternatives to all the 
companies moving to the South, Latin America, Asia. We didn’t have any 
alternative except, just keeping building organizations (Schutz and Miller, eds., 
2015: 208-209). 
  
  
Dick Harmon also commented that there was no consideration within the Alinskyan community 
that “Corporate capitalism is One system, a Whole, assaulting both human beings and the rest of 
the natural world” (Schutz and Miller, 2015, eds.: 212-213). 
Every one of these criticisms could be made of the CIO organizing inspired by John L. 
Lewis, mentor of his admiring acolyte, Saul Alinsky, who in turn employed and influenced 
Chavez. 
 The transmission of John L. Lewis-style organizing strategy from Lewis to Chavez was 
by way of a man named Fred Ross, “one of the first people on Akinsky’s payroll, and an early 
practitioner of Alinsky-style community organizing.” According to Bardacke, 
 
Chavez watched Ross work and was watched by him, he filed weekly and 
sometimes daily reports to Ross and Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). 
He studied [Alinsky’s] Reveille for Radicals. He read and reread Alinsky’s 1949 
biography of John L. Lewis . . . . During Alinsky’s regular visits to California, 
which often lasted several weeks, Chavez worked alongside the master in formal 
trainings, conferences, and fundraising events (Bardacke, 2011: 68). 
 
Alinsky, Bardacke (2011: 68-69) sums up, signed “both Fred Ross’s and Cesar Chavez’s 
checks.” 
 The editors of a recent collection of writings about Alinsky concede that within the 
farmworkers’ organization that Chavez created and led, 
 
internal purges eliminated from the staff many talented and dedicated organizers, 
while others quietly resigned in protest. The boycott became the principal 
strategic weapon of the union; on-the-ground organizing of farmworkers at 
workplaces was shunted to the sidelines. Power increasingly was concentrated in 
the hands of Cesar Chavez, who brooked no internal opposition “from below”—
i.e., from among farmworkers—and vigorously worked to defeat leaders whose 
views were different from his own (Schultz and Miller, eds., 2015:  106-107). 
  
 The authors of this critique add a criticism that has also been expressed by Marshall Ganz 
and others, namely, that Chavez insisted on appointing the members of local ranch committees 
rather than permitting them to be elected, and opposed the creation of local unions of 
farmworkers with the result that “[e]verything was run from union headquarters.” Chavez was 
also “vigorously anti-Communist, no matter what kind of Communist you happened to be” 
(Schultz and Miller, eds.:  108-109, 111). And in his zeal to protect the jobs of Hispanics already 
in the United States, Chavez did not hesitate to inform agencies of the federal government about 
the identities and whereabouts of undocumented new arrivals from Latin America.  
 
Pioneer of an Alternative: A.J. Muste 
 
 I invite the reader to compare the top-down style of union and community organizing 
practiced by John L. Lewis, Saul Alinsky, and Cesar Chavez, with the style of work of strike 
organizer and labor school administrator, A. J. Muste.6 Muste grew up in Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, a working-class city in which the major industry was making furniture. As a teenager, 
he worked in furniture factories during the summer. 
  
Muste’s initial ambition was to become a minister in the Dutch Reformed church. World 
War I caused him to become a fervent opponent of war. Refusing to abandon his newly-found 
pacifism, he was forced to give up his job as pastor of a Congregational church in Massachusetts. 
There followed a period of unemployment and renewed search for a way fully to practice 
his faith. Nineteen-nineteen (1919) found him a member of a small group of friends who called 
themselves the Comradeship. Living together in a very cold apartment, they would rise early 
every morning, bundle themselves in their overcoats, and read the New Testament together. 
Under these circumstances, the group learned of an impending strike of textile workers in nearby 
Lawrence. The comrades went to check it out, and unexpectedly were asked to help lead the 
strike. 
The work week at the Lawrence mills was 54 hours a week. Pay averaged $11.00 a week. 
The strikers’ basic demand was 54 hours pay for 48 hours’ work. Among the 50,000 workers 
who went on strike, the only union organizations were a few craft locals of skilled loom fixers 
and spinners. The men in these locals were English, Scotch, and Irish. They had no contact with 
the “great mass of foreign-born workers.” 
A provisional strike committee was organized by middle-aged Belgian, Polish, and 
Italian weavers. Most of them spoke English “brokenly or not at all.” The Comrades were invited 
to sit in on strike committee meetings. They went back to Boston every night to interpret the 
strike and to raise money in its support. 
Muste was one of many who were beaten and jailed in the course of the strike. After 
several weeks of struggle, the strike was settled. The workers won a twelve percent increase in 
hour and piece rates, and recognition in all departments of shop committees, through which the 
union would have a voice in resolving grievances  
This strike victory became the credential on which Muste relied in creating the 
Brookwood Labor College, probably the most successful school for workers in American 
history. Deeply imbedded in workers’ self-organization in the early 1930s, Muste and others 
from Brookwood played a crucial part in the initial direct actions that created many of the 
industrial unions later brought together in the CIO. 
But Muste did not follow many of his close associates into work within the emerging 
CIO. There appear to have been several reasons for his decision.  
First, he rejected the autocratic leadership of John L. Lewis. Like Roger Baldwin of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Muste assisted as best he could efforts to give rank-and-file 
miners a voice in United Mine Workers’ decision-making.7  
A second reason Muste distanced himself from the emerging CIO appears to have been 
his belief in how workers and other oppressed groups educate themselves. Muste preferred to 
emphasize learning from experience as opposed to the attempt to force theory and predetermined 
decisions on others. He comments in his autobiography that Brookwood “did not have a body of 
economic and political doctrine to inculcate. We deliberately sought to stimulate intellectual 
controversy.” Also, “as students and teachers we did not think of ourselves as temporarily 
withdrawn from the labor struggle, while preparing for future activity.” To the extent possible, 
students and teachers at Brookwood acted out the ideas that they were learning together 
(Hentoff, ed., 1967: 107). 
A third reason for Muste’s chosen trajectory was his conviction, which proved to be 
correct, that the CIO leadership would uncritically support United States’ involvement in the 
impending World War II.  
  
Muste’s third reason may seem strange to the American reader. I can imagine the 
response: why should a labor movement be concerned with the possibility of war? 
The best answer to this question, it seems to me, is that in conference after conference 
before World War I, the labor and socialist parties of Europe declared that if war came, there 
would be a world-wide-general strike in opposition to the prospect of a bloodbath in which the 
workers of one nation killed the workers of another. True, most of the world’s socialist parties 
abandoned this pledge when war actually broke out. Only a few individuals and small groups, 
such as the Bolsheviks in Russia, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany, and 
Eugene Debs in the United States, publicly opposed the governments of their own countries. 
Muste aligned himself with this honorable tradition. 
In our own lifetimes, the posture that Muste adopted toward war-making by the United 
States was formidably adopted by Howard Zinn.8 Where Muste anticipated the theme that United 
States intervention in World War II would be driven by the wish to seize and solidify its position 
as the world’s leading capitalist economy, Zinn came to this conclusion from experience, after 
volunteering for military service and becoming a bombardier. 
During World War II, Zinn was so eager to get into combat that he gave up a shipyard 
job that would have kept him safe for the duration, and arranged with his draft board to 
“volunteer for induction,” even obtaining permission to mail his induction notice to himself. 
During flight training, he was similarly anxious to get to Europe, and twice “traded with other 
bombardiers to get on the short list for overseas.” 
 Zinn tells us in his autobiography how and why his outlook began to change during his 
military service. 
Zinn had made friends with a gunner in another crew, who, like himself, read books and 
was interested in politics. One day his friend said, “You know, this is not a war against fascism. 
It’s an imperialist war.” Startled, Zinn responded, “Then why are you here?” and his friend 
replied, “To talk to guys like you.” Two weeks later his friend’s plane was shot down and the 
whole crew killed.  
Then when the war was almost over, the briefing officer said that they were going to 
bomb a French town named Royan. A few thousand German soldiers had retreated to Royan. 
They weren’t fighting, just waiting for the war to end. The planes in Zinn’s squadron were not 
going to carry their usual load but, instead, carried thirty one-hundred-pound canisters of “jellied 
gasoline.” The town of Royan was decimated, the many victims French as well as German. Only 
long after the war did Zinn recognize that this was an early use of napalm. 
 At the time of his discharge, Zinn spontaneously wrote on the folder in which he kept 
papers concerning his military service, “Never again.”  
  Muste’s summary of his own reasoning was as follows. “Brookwood might have 
survived,” he wrote, 
 
might have been supported by the unions born under the New Deal and become a 
flourishing CIO training school. . . . I would still have been out of it. To have 
become identified with the New Deal, with the CIO top leadership and, presently, 
with support of the war—this would have been for me the abandonment of my 
deepest convictions and the collapse of inner integrity (Hentoff, ed., 1967:  152-
153). 
 
  
What is left of the labor movement in the United States, and we ourselves, face choices 
similar to those confronted by A. J. Muste.  
 Muste contended that the labor movement must retain and strengthen its idealism, its 
distinctive laborite vision that keeps it from becoming beholden to “capitalist culture.” Anyone 
who has spent time in a working-class community will immediately think of examples. There are 
the families who say of themselves, “we don’t cross picket lines.” There is the subtle but all-
important understanding that the experience of solidarity in action, not ideology, comes first.  
Marty Glaberman expressed it this way. Say you are working at your machine and see a 
group of fellow workers heading down the aisle in your direction. There are too many of them to 
be going to the tool crib. It is too early for lunch. Their procession can mean only one thing, and 
so you turn off your machine; put your tools in the tool box and lock it; wipe your hands; and 
join the line on its way to the door. Only when you get outside do you turn to your fellows and 
say, “What the hell is going on?”9 
Glaberman was close to the revolutionary black workers in Detroit in the early 1970s. 
Wildcats were so frequent that, as Marty told it, “an optimist was a person who brought his lunch 
to work in the belief that he would still be inside the plant at lunch time.” 
In this same spirit, in the Auto-Lite strike in Toledo led by Muste and other like thinkers, 
unemployed workers, despite their own need for work, refused to scab and joined the picket lines 
of the striking workers (see Zietlow and Pope: 256-258).  
 
Conclusion  
 
 I have tried to understand what happened to the radicalism of the CIO. Unlike many 
other scholars, I find deficient the top-down unionism of John L. Lewis, and of others who 
advocated Lewis’ policies (like Saul Alinsky) or who implemented Lewis’ policies in other 
unions (like Cesar Chavez). Lewis had imposed on the United Mine Workers a cluster of related 
practices: a single union as exclusive bargaining representative; systematic hostility to direct 
action on the shop floor unless approved by the national union; the dues check-off; and 
management prerogative and no-strike clauses in the contract. UMW staff men like Philip 
Murray and Van Bittner carried these practices into the new CIO unions with financing from the 
UMW. 
I counter-pose the approach of A.J. Muste. Muste helped to lead the cotton textile strike 
of 1919 to victory, then founded the Brookwood Labor School—probably the most radical and 
effective school for workers in American history—and finally was a leader of the Auto-Lite 
strike in Toledo, one of the trio of local general strikes in 1934 (Minneapolis, San Francisco, 
Toledo) that frightened the employing class and Congress into accepting the more top-down, 
bureaucratic form of trade unionism represented by the CIO.  I contend that Muste’s concept of 
union organizing was based on shared values, on the practice of solidarity, and on the 
extraordinary notion that an injury to one is an injury to all. I believe that only if the labor 
movement can return to these values and practices can it be rebuilt.  
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1  Kenneth Casebeer interviewed Leon Keyserling, principal draftsperson of the National Labor 
Relations Act (Wagner Act). Casebeer asked whether there was a specific reason that the Wagner Act 
includes Section 13, which reads as originally passed: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as 
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” Keyserling replied: 
“There was a definite reason. First, because Wagner was always strong for the right to strike, which 
was labor’s ultimate weapon, they really had no other weapon. That guarantee was a part of his 
thinking. It was particularly necessary because a lot of people made the argument that because the 
government was giving labor the right to bargain collectively, that was a substitute for a right to 
strike, which was utterly wrong” (Casebeer, 1987: 353). 
2  Jeremy Brecher writes of the 1937 contract between General Motors and the UAW that ended the 
pivotal sit-down strike in Flint, Michigan that the union pledged that there would be “no suspension 
or stoppages of work . . . without the approval of the international officers of the union.” Union 
organizers and representatives were warned that they would be dismissed if they authorized any 
stoppages without the consent of the international officers. Lewis stated bluntly: “A C.I.O. contract is 
adequate protection against sit-downs, lie-downs, or any other kind of strike” (Brecher, 2014: 195-
197, 199). 
3  This is being written in Spring 1917, and there are some indications that the National Labor Relations 
Board may recognize members-only unionism. In a case called Children’s Hospital and Research 
Center of Oakland, 364 NLRB No. 114 (2016), Member Hirozawa concluded that there is no 
requirement that a union be a section 9(a) exclusive representative for an employer to have a duty to 
bargain under section 8(a)(5). 
4  My wife Alice Lynd and I found that in interviewing veterans of the 1930s, the single explanation of 
the CIO’s decline most favored by these old-timers was the introduction of the dues check-off. Their 
memory was that when the shop steward had to collect dues by hand he or she also got an earful 
about rank-and-file complaints. 
5  See, especially, Chomsky’s essay “Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship” that focus on revolutionary 
Spain (Chomsky, 2005: 40-75). 
6  The following account of A.J. Muste is based on Hentoff, ed., 1967, and two biographies, Robinson 
(1981), and Danielson (2014). 
7  For the ACLU’s deep involvement in the struggles of rank-and-file workers in the 1930s, see Daniel 
(1980). 
8  Citations for this account of the evolution of Howard Zinn’s attitude toward his country’s wars will 
be found in Lynd (2014: 22-25). 
9  I base this and the anecdote that follows on conversations with Glaberman as I was preparing the 
edition of his work (see Glaberman, 2002: 22-25).  
                                                 
